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Site licensing of electronic journals (e-journals, henceforth) has been revolutionizing the
way academic information is distributed. Under site licensing, there is no need to spend
time to look for a paper in a library and many people can download, read and print a paper
simultaneously from their oﬃces at anytime. Furthermore, e-journals’ websites provide
additional services such as search tools, hypertext linking, remote access etc. Therefore,
it seems that, sooner or later, e-journals will supplant print journals as the norm.
However, many librarians are concerned about the possibility that commercial pub-
lishers might abuse site licensing for their advantage. First, commercial publishers have
aggressively raised prices at a rate disproportionate to any increase in costs or quality.
According to Association of Research Library (ARL) in US,1 during the period of 1986-
2002, the unit cost for journal subscriptions has grown at the rate of 7.7% per year, which
is more than twice of the growth rate of the unit cost of monographs, 3.6%. As Figure
1 shows, up to 2000, the increase in the budget of the libraries could not match the in-
crease in journal prices, which resulted in a continuous decrease in the amount of journals
purchased during most of the period. High subscription prices charged by commercial
publishers even induced some academic societies whose journals had been published by
them to start new competing journals as in the case of the launch of Journal of the Eu-
ropean Economic Association by European Economic Association.2 Second, site licensing
of e-journals allows commercial publishers to employ powerful pricing strategies such as
price discrimination based on usage3 and bundling while, under print journals, neither
price discrimination and nor unbundling was the practice.4 In particular, librarians are
concerned about bundling. For instance, according to Kenneth Frazier (2001), director of
libraries at University of Wisconsin Madison,
“the content is ‘bundled’ so that individual journal subscriptions can no longer be
cancelled in their electronic format. (The Academic Press IDEAL program and the full
ScienceDirect package oﬀered by Elsevier are examples of such licensing agreements).”5
1See “Monograph and Serial Costs in ARL Libraries 1986-2002” at http://www.arl.org/stats/arlstat/.
2See Thodore Bergman’s website: http://www.econ.ucsb.edu/~tedb/Journals/alternatives.html
3For instance, Derk Haank (2001), the CEO of Elsevier Science, says ”What we are basically doing is
to say that you pay depending on how useful the publication is for you - estimated by how often you use
it.” See also Bolman (2002) and Key Perspectives (2002) about price discrimination.
4In the case of print journals, arbitrage through resale has to some extent prevented publishers from
practicing price discrimination. In contrast, in the case of e-journals, access to a journal is simply leased
and hence resale is impossible.












































Figure 1: Monograph and Serial Costs in ARL Libraries, 1986-2002 (Source: ARL)
Moreover, U.S. and U.K. competition authorities approved three years ago one of
the biggest-ever science publishing mergers between Reed-Elsevier (RE henceforth) and
Harcourt in spite of many librarians’ protests. Indeed, the report of U.K. Competition
Commission (2001) shows concern about potential welfare losses due to the merging pub-
lishers’ of bundling of their e-journals. Before the merger, RE’s ScienceDirect, was the
most developed website and oﬀered access to around 1,150 journals and Harcourt’s IDEAL
oﬀered access to 320 journals.
In this paper, we analyze publishers’ incentives to practice bundling and the ensuing
eﬀects on social welfare and derive implications on merger analysis. Instead of considering
the transition from print journals to e-journals, we consider the situation in which e-
journals are the norm and assume that publishers practice price discrimination based on
usage.6 Therefore, we assume away heterogeneity among libraries and build a model in
which each competing publisher sells a portfolio of journals to a library which wants to
risk of: (1) weakening that collection with journals we neither need nor want, and (2) increasing our
dependence on publishers who have already shown their determination to monopolize the information
market place.”
6This implies that the pricing schemes we study in this paper might not correspond to what we
observe now. In fact, the transition implies a change from subscription-based pricing models to usage-
based models and since a sudden switch in the pricing models generates a large change in the total
prices that allow a library to maintain its subscription to a given collection of journals, publishers are
introducing a progressive change (Bolman, 2002).
2build a portfolio of journals and monographs under a budget constraint.7 We analyze how
bundling aﬀects journal pricing through its impact on the library’s allocation of budget
between journals and books. Although we assume that there is no direct substitution
among the journals in that the value the library derives from a journal is determined
independently of whether or not it buys any other journal, there can be an indirect
substitution among journals and among journals and monographs8 through the budget
constraint. The utility that the library derives from spending money on books is assumed
to be strictly increasing and strictly concave.
We ﬁrst consider independent pricing (i.e., no-bundling) and show an irrelevance result
that market structure does not aﬀect prices. For instance, in the simple case of homoge-
nous journals in which every journal has the same value, we show that all the journals are
sold at the same price for any market structure. The irrelevance result holds also in the
general case of heterogenous journals if the equilibrium exists and if the industry proﬁti s
lower than the budget: in particular, we show the equivalence between the outcome under
the maximum concentration (i.e., the monopolist outcome) and the outcome under the
minimum concentration in which each publisher sells only one journal. The irrelevance
result is related to the fact that under independent pricing, each journal is priced accord-
ing to a “marginal opportunity cost pricing rule” in the following sense: when a publisher
sells a journal, he expects that his journal is the marginal journal (i.e., the last journal
purchased by the library) and chooses a price p to match the library’s opportunity cost of
using p such that the library is indiﬀerent between buying the journal at p and spending p
instead on buying books. A monopolist cannot realize a higher proﬁt than the one under
the marginal opportunity cost pricing rule since, in order to realize a higher proﬁt, he has
to increase the price of the marginal journal, which induces the library to stop buying the
journal.
When bundling is allowed, we show that each publisher has an incentive to bundle
all his journals. We identify two eﬀects of bundling. First, bundling has the direct eﬀect
of softening competition from books. To provide an intuition, let us consider a publisher
having two journals of the same value u. Under independent pricing, he expects that each
of his journals is the last journal to be purchased and chooses the same price p for them.
Suppose now that he bundles the journals and chooses 2p as a price for the bundle. If the
7Typically, an academic library’s material budget is spent on journals and monographs (Gooden et
al. (2002)).
8Because of journal price increases, many university libraries have been forced to reallocate dollars
from monographs to journals (Kyrillidou (1999)).
3bundle is the last to be purchased among all the bundles (or journals), the library must be
strictly better oﬀ by buying the bundle than by spending 2p on books: since the marginal
utility from spending money on books strictly decreases, the utility from spending 2p on
books is strictly smaller than twice the utility from spending p on books. Therefore, the
publisher can charge 2p + ε(> 2p) for the bundle and still induce the library to buy it.
This direct eﬀect of bundling increases with the size of bundle, which implies that a large
publisher gains much more than a small publisher in terms of the direct eﬀect.
Second, a publisher’s bundling has an indirect eﬀect of inﬂicting negative pecuniary
externalities on all the other publishers. The very fact that bundling allows a publisher
to increase his proﬁt implies that after the bundling of a publisher, there is less budget
left for books and all the other publishers’ journals. This in turn implies that for all the
other publishers, the competition from books is tougher and therefore they have to lower
their prices in order to sell them. In particular, a small publisher which has only a small
number of journals does not gain much from the direct eﬀect of bundling while he can lose
a lot from the indirect eﬀect if big publishers bundle their journals. Therefore, bundling
is a proﬁtable and credible strategy: it not only increases the bundling publisher’s proﬁt
but also decreases the proﬁts of rivals and can even induce their exit.
T h ei n s i g h tb a s e do nt h ed i r e c ta n di n d i r e c te ﬀects of bundling suggests that any
merger increases the merging publishers’ proﬁts because of the direct eﬀect while reducing
the rivals’ proﬁts because of the indirect eﬀect. We also show that bundling (or any
merger) increases the industry proﬁt. This result implies that the library consumes less
books after bundling. Since bundling can induce exit of small publishers, we conclude that
bundling decreases social welfare by reducing both book and journal consumption. For
the same reasons, any asymmetry-increasing merger reduces social welfare. Our ﬁnding
is consistent with the prediction of Kyrillidou (1999) that if the current trend continues,
the budget for monographs will be the resource depleted fastest, as only about 10% of
the materials budget will be spent on purchasing monographs by 2019. Finally, when
we examine publishers’ incentive to acquire a journal from a third-party, we ﬁnd that
in the absence of bundling all the publishers have the same willingness to pay for the
journal while under bundling, the largest publisher has always the highest willingness to
pay. This suggests that bundling might seriously aﬀect industry dynamics such that the
largest publisher becomes even larger through the purchase of the titles sold by small
publishers forced to exit the market.
Most of the papers on bundling study bundling of two (physical) goods in the context
of second-degree price discrimination and focus on either surplus extraction (Schmalensee
4(1984), McAfee et al. (1989), Salinger (1995) and Armstrong (1996, 1999)) or entry
deterrence (Whinston (1990) and Nalebuﬀ (2004)). Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999, 2000)’s
papers are an exception in that they study bundling of a large number of information goods
while maintaining the second-degree price discrimination framework. Their ﬁrst paper
shows that bundling allows a monopolist to extract more surplus since the law of large
numbers reduces the variance of average valuations9 and the second paper applies this
insight to entry deterrence. Although we study bundling of a large number of information
goods, our model is quite diﬀerent from theirs since the law of large numbers cannot
be applied in our setting as we assume complete information on the buyer’s valuation
for each object in sale. Conventional wisdom says that bundling has no eﬀect in such
a setting and this is true if the budget constraint is not binding. However, when the
constraint is binding, we show that bundling is a proﬁtable and credible strategy both in
terms of surplus extraction and entry deterrence since bundling allows a ﬁrm to extract
more surplus by softening competition from an alternative use of the budget (books in our
setting) and, furthermore, reduces the other ﬁrms’ proﬁts by inﬂicting on them negative
pecuniary externalities.
Our paper is related to McCabe (2002b)’s paper that studies the pricing of print and
e-journals.10 In the case of print journals, he assumes no price discrimination and no
bundling while, in the case of e-journals, he assumes prefect price discrimination and
bundling. Although his setting is similar to ours, there are important diﬀerences. First,
he considers the transition from print journals to e-journals while we consider the situation
when this transition is over. Second, he does not provide the comparative statics of the
transition while we provide the comparative statics of bundling versus no-bundling in the
digital world. Furthermore, he assumes bundling in the case of e-journals while we show
that in equilibrium all publishers adopt bundling. Last, he does not consider substitution
between books and journals.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. In Section
3, we consider the simple case of homogenous journals and explain all our main results
with minimum technical details. In Section 4, we consider the general case of homogenous
journals and provide a theorem covering this case. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
All the proofs which do not appear in the main text are gathered in Appendix.
9See also Armstrong (1999).
10He has also an empirical paper (2002a), already published, that shows that mergers signiﬁcantly
contributed to journal price increases.
52M o d e l
As we said in the introduction, we consider the situation in which the transition from print
journals to e-journals is completed. Since at the mature stage of site-licensing, journal
prices will depend on usage, we assume that publishers have complete information about
the value that a library attaches to a journal. Furthermore, this assumption allows us
to focus on the eﬀects of bundling which arise when one cannot apply the law of large
numbers. Therefore, we assume away heterogeneity of libraries and consider a library
with budget M(> 0), which is assumed to be known to all publishers.
2.1 Journals and publishers
There are N number of publishers; publisher j is often denoted simply by j.W e o n l y
consider proﬁt-maximizing publishers. Let nj be the number of journals that publisher
j publishes (j =1 ,...,N)a n dn ≡
PN
j=1 nj(≥ N) the total number of journals. Let
uij > 0 represent the utility (or the surplus) the library obtains from journal i =1 ,...,nj
of publisher j.L e t Uj ≡
Pnj
i=1 uij and U ≡
PN
j=1 Uj. The marginal cost of producing
(i.e., providing access to) a (existing) journal is assumed to be zero.
In order to focus on the impact of bundling on journal pricing, we consider a situation
in which the number of journals produced by publisher j is exogenously ﬁxed at nj (and
therefore Uj is also given) and the ﬁxed cost of producing them has already been incurred.
An important diﬀerence between print journals and e-journals is that for print journals,
each year a publisher sells only the subscription of that year while, in the case of e-journals,
in principle, each year (or each period) a publisher licences the access to both the current
issues and the whole previous issues. Therefore, if journals are already well established
and have quite a volume of previous issues, at least in a short run it is reasonable to
assume that publishers already incurred the ﬁxed cost of producing the journals.
When each journal is sold independently (i.e., in the absence of bundling), publisher j
chooses price pij > 0 for journal ihe owns. Let p ≡ (p11,...,pn11,...,p1N,...,pnNN) ∈ Rn
++
represent the price vector under independent pricing. Under bundling, publisher j chooses
price Pj > 0 for the bundle of all his journals; we use Bj to represent the bundle of j.L e t
P ≡ (P1,...,PN) ∈ RN
++ denote the price vector under bundling.
62.2 Library
The library allocates a ﬁxed budget M>0 between buying journals and books (mono-
graphs). The library’s payoﬀ is given by the sum of three components: the utility it draws
from the journals it purchased, the utility it draws from the books it bought and the money
left after the purchases. We deﬁne a reduced-form utility for books by an indirect utility
function v :[ 0 ,+∞) → R+ such that v(m) is the library’s utility from books when it
spends m ≥ 0 amount of money on buying books; v(0) = 0 and v0(m) > 0 >v 00(m) for
any m ≥ 0, hence v(·) is strictly increasing and strictly concave. We further assume that
v0(m) > 1 for all m ≤ M, therefore the library prefers buying books to keeping money.
When each journal is sold independently, we let xij ∈ {0,1} represent the library’s
choice about journal ij: xij =1(xij =0 ) means that the library buys (does not buy) this
journal; hence, x ≡ (x11,...,xn11,...,x1N,...,xnNN) belongs to {0,1}n. When all publishers
use bundling, Xj ∈ {0,1} represents the library’s choice about Bj: Xj =1(Xj =0 )m e a n s
that the library buys (does not buy) this bundle; let X ≡ (X1,...,XN) ∈ {0,1}
N.




















i=1 pijxij + m ≤ M.12 Under bundling, given










subject to the budget constraint
PN
j=1 PjXj + m ≤ M.
2.3 Social welfare
Social welfare is deﬁned as the sum of the payoﬀ of the library, the proﬁts of the journal
publishers and the proﬁt of the book industry. The cost of producing a book is composed
11As a tie-breaking rule, we assume that if the library is indiﬀerent between buying a journal (or a
bundle) and not buying, it buys the journal/bundle. Without this assumption, no equilibrium would
exist.
12I nt h et i m i n g( d e s c r i b e di ns u b s e c t i o n2 . 4 ) ,e a c hp u b l i s h e rs h o u l dm a k ea ne n t r yd e c i s i o nb e f o r e
choosing prices. Hence, (1) is correct if all publishers enter. If some publishers do not enter, j runs over
the set of the publishers which entered.
7of a ﬁxed cost and a marginal cost, about which we make a simplifying assumption: the
ﬁxed cost incurred by the book industry is not aﬀected by the library’s choice of m and
the marginal cost of producing a book is zero.13 Therefore, social welfare is equal, up to
a constant, to the total utility the library draws from journals and books.
2.4 Timing
We consider a three-stage game among publishers. At stage one, each publisher simul-
taneously decides whether or not to enter the market; entry is costless. For equilibrium
selection, we assume that each publisher prefers to stay out and not to engage in com-
petition if his proﬁt upon entry is zero. Let E ⊆ {1,...,N} denote the set of publishers
which enter the market; these are called active publishers.
At stage two, each publisher simultaneously decides (i) whether to bundle or not his
journals and (ii) the price of his bundle or the prices of his journals. Actually, after
studying the case of no-bundling (when each journal is sold independently) in subsection
3.1 and the case of bundling (when each publisher bundles all his journals) in subsection
3.2, we examine in subsection 3.3 each publisher’s incentive to choose between bundling
and no-bundling.
At stage three, the library makes its purchase decision.
We use the concept of Nash equilibrium (NE) to analyze the game starting at stage
two and the concept of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) to predict the outcome
of the game starting at stage one.
3 The simple case of homogenous journals
In this section we derive all our main results in the simple case of homogenous journals,
which means that uij = u>0 for all ij. In the next section, we consider the general case
of heterogeneous journals.
3.1 Independent pricing (no-bundling)
We begin our analysis with the case of independent pricing, which means that at stage two
journals are priced independently by active publishers. For expositional facility, we ﬁrst
introduce the concept of marginal bundle ofb o o k sa sf o l l o w s :g i v e na ni n d u s t r yp r o ﬁt
13This is only a simplifying assumption. Our social welfare analysis is not qualitatively aﬀected if the
(ﬁxed or marginal) cost incurred by the book industry depends on m.
8from journals denoted by π (≤ M),d e ﬁne the marginal bundle of books corresponding
to price p as all the books that the library wishes to buy with budget p after already
spending M − π on books. Then, the utility from the marginal bundle of books is given
by





It is useful to note some properties of UMB w h i c hw i l lb ef r e q u e n t l yu s e di nt h i sp a p e r ;
these properties result from the fact that v(·) is strictly concave and strictly increasing:
(i) UMB strictly increases with both p and π; (ii) UMB is strictly concave in p.
In order to illustrate the usefulness of UMB(·), we consider the case in which each
publisher sells only one journal (i.e., N = n) and charges the same price p(≤ M
n ). Then,
the library prefers buying n0 number of journals (with 1 ≤ n0 ≤ n)t ob u y i n gn0 − 1
number of journals if the following inequality holds:
n
0u + v(M − n
0p) ≥ (n
0 − 1)u + v(M − n
0p + p)
which is equivalent to
u ≥ UMB(p,n
0p).
Since UMB(p,π) strictly increases with π, UMB(p,n0p) strictly increases with n0.T h i s
in turn implies that the library ﬁnds it optimal to buy all the journals if and only if it
prefers buying n number of journals to buying n − 1 (i.e., if and only if u ≥ UMB(p,np)
holds). Furthermore, if u<U MB(M
n ,M), p∗ satisfying u = UMB(p∗,np ∗) is an equilibrium.
Suppose that all publishers except j charge p∗.I f j charges p∗,t h e nh i sp r o ﬁti sp∗.
Therefore, he has no incentive to choose any price lower than p∗. Suppose that he chooses
pj (>p ∗). Then, u<U MB(pj,(n − 1)p∗ + pj) holds and this inequality is equivalent to
(n − 1)u + v(M − (n − 1)p
∗) >n u+ v(M − (n − 1)p
∗ − pj),
which implies that the library buys all journals except that of j.I nc a s eu ≥ UMB(M
n ,M)=
v(M
n ) holds, p∗ = M
n is an equilibrium. Still, publisher j has no incentive to choose a price
lower than p∗ s i n c eh ec a nr e a l i z ep r o ﬁt p∗ by charging p∗.I f h e c h o o s e s pj >p ∗,t h e
library cannot aﬀord to buy all the journals and therefore will drop j’s one, which is the
most expensive journal.
The next proposition states that regardless of the market structure, there exists a
unique equilibrium in which all the publishers enter and charge p∗.
9Proposition 1 (irrelevance result) Suppose that all the journals are homogenous (i.e.,
uij = u>0 for all ij) and priced independently.
(i) When M>n v −1(u): There exists a unique SPNE that is the same for any market
structure. In the equilibrium, all publishers enter and all the journals are purchased at




(ii) When M ≤ nv−1(u): There exists a unique SPNE that is the same for any market
structure (except the monopoly case in which the uniqueness result may not hold). In the
equilibrium, all publishers enter and all the journals are purchased at prices pij = p∗ for
any ij where p∗ = M/n.
Proof. Conditional on all publishers’ entering, we show below that if all publishers except
j charge the same price p∗, a best response of publisher j consists in setting pij = p∗ for
i =1 ,...,nj; this establishes that pij = p∗ for any ij is a NE of the pricing game. In the
proof of theorem 2, we prove that, in a more general setting with heterogenous journals,
at most one NE exists under no-bundling; therefore we obtain equilibrium uniqueness in
the environment with homogeneous journals. At the unique equilibrium, each publisher
makes a positive proﬁt if he enters regardless of how many other publishers are active;
hence, in any SPNE each publisher enters.
(i) When M>n v −1(u).
Suppose that all publishers except j choose price p∗.W es t u d yt h eo p t i m a lp r i c i n go fj
having nj number of journals: the monopoly case is a special case with nj = n.N o t i c et h a t
for any pj ≡ (p1j,...,p njj), the library will purchase all the journals of which the prices are
l o w e rt h a no re q u a lt op∗ because it is willing to buy nnumber of journals at price p∗ from
(2). This implies that, in particular, for any pj all the journals of publisher k (with k 6= j)
will be purchased. Publisher j realizes a proﬁt njp∗ when it chooses p1j = ... = pnjj ≡ p∗.
We now prove by contradiction that he cannot realize any proﬁt strictly higher than njp∗.
Suppose that he realizes a proﬁt πj strictly higher than njp∗.T h i sm u s ti m p l yt h a tt h e
highest price among all the journals sold by publisher j, denoted by p
(1)
j , is strictly larger
than p∗. Since all the other publishers charge p∗, p
(1)
j is the highest price among all the
journals sold. However, we have u = UMB(p∗,np ∗) <U MB(p
(1)
j ,(n − nj)p∗ + πj) since
UMB(·,·) strictly increases in both arguments. This inequality implies that the library
ﬁnds it optimal not to buy the highest priced journal: therefore, we get a contradiction.
By using a similar argument, we can prove that p1j = ... = pnjj ≡ p∗ is the only way for j
to realize the proﬁt njp∗.S u p p o s et h a tj realizes the proﬁt njp∗ by choosing pj diﬀerent
10from (p∗,...,p∗). This implies that the highest price among all the journals sold by jp
(1)
j
is strictly larger than p∗.B u tw eh a v eu = UMB(p∗,np ∗) <U MB(p
(1)
j ,np ∗), which implies
that the library does not buy the highest priced journal, leading to a contradiction.
(ii) When M ≤ nv−1(u).
Suppose that all publishers diﬀerent from j charge the same prices M/n = p∗ for their jour-
nals. If pij = M/n for i =1 ,...,nj, then all journals are sold because u ≥ UMB(M/n,M)
is equivalent to M ≤ nv−1(u). The inequality u ≥ UMB(M/n,M) implies that the library
will purchase all the journals with prices equal to M/n or smaller. This implies in par-
ticular that for any pj, all journals of the publishers diﬀerent from j will be purchased.
Therefore, M − (n − nj)p∗(= njp∗) is the maximum amount of money the library will
spend on journals of publisher j and this is the proﬁt j achieves by setting pij = M/n for
i =1 ,...,nj. In the monopoly case, selling all the journals at price p∗ is an equilibrium:
however, it is also possible for a monopolist to realize the same proﬁt M by selling a
subset of his journals.
A si ss h o w ni nF i g u r e2 ,w h e nt h ei n d u s t r yp r o ﬁt from journals np∗ is smaller than
M, p∗ is determined by the “marginal opportunity cost pricing” in the following sense:
when a publisher chooses a price for each of his journals, he considers each journal the
marginal journal (i.e., the last journal purchased by the library) and chooses the price
p∗ such that after purchasing n −1 number of journals, the library is indiﬀerent between
buying an extra journal at p∗ and spending p∗ instead on buying books: the area of
the rectangular ABCD is equal to u.14 The irrelevance result says that all the journals
are sold at the same price p∗ for any market structure. In order to give an intuition of
the result, we consider when p∗ < M
N holds and ask why a monopolist cannot achieve a
strictly better outcome than the one under the minimum industry concentration (i.e., each
publisher sells only one journal). Note that in the equilibrium, all the journals are sold.
In order to increase his proﬁt, a monopolist can employ a strategy of cross-subsidization
(i.e., decreasing the prices of some journals and increase the prices of some other journals)
or a strategy of selling only a subset of journals or a combination of the two. However,
none of the strategies can allow him to achieve a higher proﬁt. First, achieving a higher
proﬁt implies that the highest price among all the journals sold is strictly larger than
p∗. Second, this implies that the library prefers not buying the most expensive journal
14The fact that each publisher regards his journal as the marginal one when choosing its price is similar
to what happens in the literature on multilateral bargaining (Stole and Zweibel (1996a,b) and Chemla
(2003)). For instance, Chemla studies competition among downstream ﬁrms selling to an upstream one
and ﬁnds that each downstream ﬁrm pays the price that the marginal ﬁrm would pay to the upstream
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Figure 2: Equilibrium under independent pricing when M>n v −1(u) holds
since it is indiﬀerent between buying the journal at price p∗ and not buying it when the
industry proﬁti snp∗. Therefore, we get a contradiction.
Example 1 Suppose v(m)=3 1 m − m2, M =1 0 , u =4 2 , n =3 .T h e n UMB(p,π)=
p(31 −p −2(M −π)). Under independent pricing, by proposition 1, the equilibrium price
p∗ of each journal (regardless of market structure) is such that UMB(p∗,3p∗)=4 2since
v(M
n ) >u ,i m p l y i n gp∗ =2 .
From the irrelevance result, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 1 Under homogenous journals and independent pricing,
(i) no merger has an impact on (merging or non-merging) ﬁrms’ proﬁts and therefore
ﬁrms have no strict incentive to merger.
(ii) no merger has an impact on social welfare unless the merger creates a monopolist
realizing a proﬁte q u a lt oM.
Corollary 1(ii) deserves some explanation. If the industry proﬁti se q u a lt oM,a
monopolist can achieve the same proﬁt by selling a subset of journals. Therefore, a
merger creating a monopolist can reduce social welfare if the monopolist sells a smaller
number of journals than n.
123.2 Bundling
We consider here the case of bundling, which means that at stage two each active publisher
bundles his journals and chooses a price for it. Because of homogeneity, we have Uj =
Pnj
i=1 uij = nju and, without loss of generality, we suppose that U1 ≥ U2 ≥ ... ≥ UN.
Let E∗ represent the equilibrium set of active publishers, P∗ ≡ {P∗
j : j ∈ E∗} the




industry proﬁt under bundling. The analysis we perform is unaﬀected by whether the
journals are homogenous or heterogenous because what matters is the values U1,...,UN
of the diﬀerent bundles; therefore, the results in this subsection apply to the setting of
heterogenous journals as well. The next theorem characterizes the unique SPNE in this
environment.
Theorem 1 Suppose that each publisher bundles his journals at stage two. Then, there
exists a unique SPNE and it is characterized as follows:15
(i) If M ≤ v−1(U1 − U2), only the largest publisher enters and realizes proﬁt P∗
1 = M.
(ii) If M is such that there exists k ∈ {2,...,N} satisfying
Pk−1
j=1 v−1(Uj − Uk) <M≤
Pk
j=1 v−1(Uj − Uk+1) (with UN+1 ≡ 0), only the k largest publishers enter and charge
prices P∗ satisfying πB∗ =
Pk
j=1 P∗
j = M and
Uj − UMB(P
∗
j ,M)=Uj0 − UMB(P
∗












B∗)=Uj j =1 ,...,N. (4)
Proof. See Appendix.
We ﬁrst note that the particular case of proposition 1 in which nj =1for any j (i.e.,
each publisher owns only one journal) is a special case of the parts (ii)-(iii) of this theorem
with Uj = u for all j and N = n. Note also that all the bundles are sold if and only if
M>
PN−1
j=1 v−1(Uj −UN) holds. If M ≤
PN−1
j=1 v−1(Uj −UN) holds, bundling induces the
exit of small publishers while, under no-bundling, all journals are sold for any value of M.
In what follows, we provide the main intuition about the equilibrium under bundling by
examining a special case with two publishers such that U1 >U 2.
15Actually, uniqueness of SPNE obtains only along the equilibrium path: there exist several SPNE
in this game, but they diﬀer only oﬀ the equilibrium path. In the appendix we provide the complete
strategy proﬁle for a SPNE immediately after the proof of theorem 1.
13Consider ﬁrst the case in which both publishers enter, sell their bundles and πB∗ is
smaller than M. Then, the equilibrium prices P∗ =( P∗
1,P∗







2)=Uj,f o rj =1 ,2. (5)
Publisher j expects that the other bundle is purchased and chooses his price making the
library indiﬀerent between buying his own bundle and not buying it. P∗ constitutes a Nash
equilibrium. First, obviously, lowering Pj below P∗
j is not optimal for publisher j. Second,
if Pj is increased above P∗
j , then the library prefers dropping Bj since at P∗ the library is
indiﬀerent between dropping any single bundle and buying both bundles. A solution to (5)
exists if and only if M ≥ v−1(U1)+v−1(U2).I np a r t i c u l a r ,w h e nM = v−1(U1)+v−1(U2),
we have P∗
j = v−1(Uj) and πB∗ = M from UMB(P∗
j ,M)(= v(P∗
j )) = Uj.
Second, consider the case in which all the publishers enter, sell their bundles and





2,M) ≥ 0. (6)
Publisher j still expects that the other bundle is purchased, but now the library gets a
positive surplus with respect to the option of spending P∗
j on books. Notice that there
is a kind of Bertrand competition such that this surplus is the same for all the bundles.
P∗ constitutes a Nash equilibrium since lowering a price is not optimal and if publisher j
chooses a price higher than P∗
j , the library cannot aﬀord to buy both bundles and prefers
dropping Bj since at P∗ the library is indiﬀerent between dropping B1 and dropping B2.
Finally, we can obtain the condition under which publisher 1 can sell B1 at price
P∗
1 = M by inserting P∗
1 = M and P∗
2 =0into (6); then we obtain U1 − v(M)=U2,
meaning v−1(U1 −U2)=M. Indeed, a solution to (6) exists if and only if v−1(U1 −U2) ≤
M ≤ v−1(U1)+v−1(U2). Intuitively, when U1 ≥ v(M)+U2 holds, publisher 1 can drive
publisher 2 out of the market since for any P2 > 0, the library’s payoﬀ from buying B1
at price P1 = M (i.e., U1)i sl a r g e rt h a nU2 + v(M − P2),t h ep a y o ﬀ from buying B2 at
P2 > 0 and spending M − P2 > 0 on books.
Example 2 Suppose v(m)=3 1 m−m2, M =1 0 , u =4 2 , n =3as in example 1. Under
bundling.

















14since M>v −1(2u)+v−1(u);h e n c eP∗
1 =4 .36552 and P∗






(ii) When N =1and n1 =3 , the monopolist chooses Pm satisfying UMB(Pm,Pm)=1 2 6
since M>v −1(3u),h e n c ePm =7 . Notice that Pm >P ∗
1 + P∗
2 > 3p∗.
Theorem 1 and the discussion following the theorem show that prices under bundling
are determined by the marginal opportunity cost pricing as under independent pricing.
This is literally true when πB∗ <M .W h e n πB∗ = M, the equilibrium prices are such
that each bundle should give the same extra surplus with respect to the opportunity
cost (i.e., the utility that the library gets from the marginal bundle of books). This
competition between each bundle of journals and the marginal bundle of books implies
that a large publisher (i.e., a publisher with high Uj) has a competitive advantage over a
small publisher. Given πB∗,s i n c ev0(·) is strictly decreasing, as the number of books in
the marginal bundle increases, the average surplus of the books in this bundle decreases.
Therefore, the marginal bundle of books competing with the bundle of a large publisher
has a lower average surplus than the marginal bundle of books competing with the bundle
of a small publisher. The next corollary formalizes this intuition in two diﬀerent, although




strictly increases with the total value of his bundle Uj; the second result establishes that
a large publisher gets a relatively large share of the industry proﬁt.
Corollary 2 16U n d e rb u n d l i n gw eh a v e







(ii) If E ⊂ E∗ is such that U1 ≥
P





3.3 Incentive to bundle
In the previous sections, we examined the two diﬀerent regimes of no-bundling and
bundling. In this section, we inquire which of these regimes will emerge endogenously
by examining each publisher’ incentive to bundle. We have the following result.
Proposition 2 (i) If publisher j realizes proﬁt πj > 0 under independent pricing, then
he can earn the same proﬁt by bundling his journals at price Pj = πj
(ii) in any SPNE in which publisher j is active, he bundles his journals if nj ≥ 2.
16The proof of the corollary is straightforward and hence omitted.
15Proof. See Appendix.
This result says that any proﬁt publisher j can make without bundling his journals
can also be obtained by bundling the journals; therefore, bundling is a weakly dominant
strategy for each publisher. However, this fact might be consistent with the existence of
a SPNE in which one (or more) publisher(s) does not bundle. The second part of the
proposition establishes that this is impossible.
We can provide the intuition for the incentive to bundle by examining a simple case.
Suppose that publisher j has two journals and, when he does not bundle his journals, the
industry proﬁti sπ <M. In this case, the prices chosen by publisher j are the same and
this price, denoted by pj,s a t i s ﬁes the following equation:
UMB(pj,π)=u, (7)
where, given the industry proﬁt π, pj makes the utility from the marginal bundle of books
equal to u.
Suppose now that publisher j bundles his journals. Consider ﬁrst the case in which he










Under independent pricing, both journals compete with the same marginal bundle of
books having the utility UMB(pj,π). In contrast, under bundling, it is as if the ﬁrst journal
competes with the same marginal bundle of books having utility UMB(pj,π), while the
second journal competes with the marginal bundle of books having utility UMB(pj,π−pj),
which is smaller than UMB(pj,π).I no t h e rw o r d s ,g i v e nap r o ﬁt π > 0, the average surplus
of the marginal bundle of books corresponding to price pj is strictly higher than that of
the marginal bundle of books corresponding to 2pj.T h e r e f o r e , bundling has the direct
eﬀect of softening competition from books. More precisely, there exists an ε > 0 satisfying
the inequality
UMB(2pj + ε,π + ε) ≤ 2u.
Therefore, if publisher j charges Pj =2 pj +ε as the price for bundle, the library will buy
it and bundling allows publisher 1 to realize a strictly higher proﬁt.
163.4 Comparative Statics
3.4.1 Industry proﬁt and social welfare
We here study the eﬀect of bundling on industry proﬁt and social welfare. Let πI∗ denote
the industry proﬁt under independent pricing. We have:
Proposition 3 (i) If M>n v −1(u), bundling strictly increases the industry proﬁt: πB∗ >
πI∗.I fM ≤ nv−1(u),b u n d l i n gd o e sn o ta ﬀect the industry proﬁt: πB∗ = πI∗ = M.
(ii) Bundling reduces social welfare by reducing book consumption and journal con-
sumption.
Proof. (i) From proposition 1 we know that πI∗ = M if M ≤ nv−1(u). In contrast, theo-
rem 1 shows that πB∗ = M when M ≤
PN
j=1 v−1(Uj).S i n c ev−1(0) = 0 and v−1 is strictly
convex, Uj = nju implies njv−1(u) <v −1(Uj) a n di nt u r nnv−1(u) <
PN
j=1 v−1(Uj);t h i s
proves the second part of the proposition (i).
Suppose now M>n v −1(u),s ot h a tπI∗ <M.I fM ≤
PN
j=1 v−1(Uj) holds, then πB∗ = M
from theorem 1 and the proposition (i) trivially holds. Suppose in contrast that M>
PN
j=1 v−1(Uj),s ot h a tπB∗ <Mby theorem 1. In order to prove that πB∗ > πI∗,w e
notice that for each publisher j we have
njUMB(p
∗,π




Deﬁne Pj(π) by Uj ≡ UMB(Pj(π),π) and observe that Pj(.) is strictly decreasing since
UMB(·,·) is strictly increasing in both arguments. Since UMB is concave in the ﬁrst
argument, the ﬁrst two equalities in (8) imply Pj(πI∗) >n jp∗ for any nj ≥ 2.W e
now prove πB∗ > πI∗ by contradiction. Suppose πB∗ ≤ πI∗.S i n c e Pj(.) is strictly
decreasing, we must have P∗






j=1 njp∗ = πI∗, which is a contradiction.
(ii) The fact that bundling increases the industry proﬁt implies that the library con-
sumes fewer books under bundling than under no-bundling. Furthermore, all the journals
are sold under no-bundling while bundling can induce the exit of small publishers from
theorem 1.
The intuition for proposition 3 (i) is simple. We have seen in Section 3.3 that, for
each publisher, bundling has a direct eﬀect of softening the competition he faces from
books. Suppose πI∗ <Mand bundling does not increase the industry proﬁt (i.e., πB∗ ≤
πI∗). Then, the marginal bundle of books corresponding to a given price p has a lower
value under bundling than under independent pricing (i.e., UMB(p,πB∗) ≤ UMB(p,πI∗)).
17Therefore, each publisher must be able to strictly increase his proﬁt from the direct eﬀect
and hence we get a contradiction.
If the publishers are symmetric in the sense that U1 = ... = UN, then bundling
increases the proﬁt of each publisher. If instead publishers are asymmetric, the fact that
bundling increases the industry proﬁt is a bad news for small publishers who cannot
beneﬁt much from the direct eﬀect of bundling. To provide an intuition, let us consider
the competition between a big publisher with U1 =( n−N +1)u (and n>N) and N −1
number of small publishers with U2 = ... = UN = u. Suppose that p∗ < M
n without
bundling and then consider bundling. Obviously, no small publisher can beneﬁtf r o m
bundling since it has only one journal. However, by proposition 3, the big publisher’s
bundling increases the industry proﬁt: πB∗ >n p ∗. This has a negative indirect eﬀect on
all the small publishers’ proﬁts through pecuniary externalities since the marginal bundle
of books corresponding to a given price of journal has a higher surplus after the bundling
than before the bundling. For instance, if πB∗ <M , each small publisher’s proﬁt under
bundling is P∗
2 with UMB(P∗
2,πB∗)=u = UMB(p∗,np ∗), which implies that P∗
2 is smaller
than p∗. Furthermore, as we have seen in theorem 1, these pecuniary externalities can
induce the exit of all small publishers if U1 is large enough to satisfy M ≤ v−1(U1 − U2).
Since the fact that bundling increases the industry proﬁti m p l i e st h a tt h el i b r a r yc o n s u m e s
fewer books under bundling than under no-bundling, bundling reduces social welfare by
reducing book and journal consumption.
Remark (independent budget for journals): When there is an independent bud-
get for journals, we have v(m)=m. Since most of the eﬀects of bundling are based on
the strict concavity of v(m), one can expect that bundling has no eﬀect in this setting. In
f a c t ,t h i si st r u ea sl o n ga sU ≤ M: then each publisher is indiﬀerent between bundling
and no-bundling since the equilibrium price of a journal or a bundle is simply equal to
its value. However, when U>M , although bundling does not aﬀect the industry proﬁt
which is equal to M, it can reduce social welfare by inducing exit of small publishers. As
theorem 1 on bundling shows, when the industry proﬁti se q u a lt oM,t h e r ei sak i n do f
Bertrand competition among bundles which makes the extra surplus that the library gets
from a bundle with respect to its option of keeping money constant across all the bundles
sold. Therefore, Uj/P ∗
j decreases with Uj, creating advantage to large publishers.
3.4.2 Mergers
We have seen that no incentive to merger exists under independent pricing. We here
study how bundling aﬀects this incentive. Let πAM∗ (πBM∗) represent the industry proﬁt
18after the merger (before the merger) under bundling and EBM∗ denote the set of active
publishers before the merger.
Proposition 4 Consider a merger of any two publishers j and k such that {j,k} ⊂ EBM∗
and πBM∗
j + πBM∗
k <M.T h em e r g e r
(i) strictly increases the joint proﬁt of the merging publishers and strictly decreases the
proﬁt of any other publisher;
(ii) strictly increases the industry proﬁti fπBM∗ <M,o t h e r w i s eπAM∗ = πBM∗ = M.
(iii) Any asymmetry-increasing merger reduces social welfare.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition says that a merger between any two active ﬁrms is strictly proﬁtable
unless the two ﬁrms already monopolize the market. As we mentioned before, under
bundling each Bj competes with the marginal bundle of books and the average surplus
of this bundle decreases as the number of books increases. Therefore, a large bundle of
journals faces a relatively soft competition from books. In this way, merger increases
the proﬁt of the merged publishers and the industry proﬁt . H o w e v e r ,t h ef a c tt h a tt h e
library spends more money on the journals of the merging publishers imposes negative
pecuniary externalities on all the other publishers, which therefore suﬀer a loss in proﬁt
because of the merger. In particular, an asymmetry-increasing merger can induce the
exit of small publishers. Since any merger decreases book consumption by increasing the
industry proﬁt, we conclude that any asymmetry-increasing merger reduces social welfare
by reducing both journal and book consumption.
3.5 Bundling and incentive to acquire a journal
The previous results have shown that bundling can induce exit of small publishers.17 Small
publishers who are forced to exit the market will attempt to sell their journals to other
publishers. In this section, we study how bundling aﬀects publishers’ incentive to acquire
a journal sold by a third party (such as a publisher exiting the market). We assume that
a third-party sells a journal with value u through a second-price auction to publishers and
we focus on the unique undominated equilibrium of this auction, in which each publisher
bids his willingness to pay for the journal. In order for the auction to make sense, we
17Actually, some publishers think that if they are below number ﬁve in the shopping list of libraries,
there is no guarantee that there will be any money left in the budget of the libraries (Key Perspectives
(2002)).
19suppose that there are at least two publishers making a positive proﬁtb e f o r et h ea u c t i o n
in the two regimes of no-bundling and bundling and U1 >U 2. We study how bundling
aﬀects the winner of the auction.
3.5.1 Independent pricing (no-bundling)
Let p∗(n) denote the equilibrium price described by proposition 1 as a function of the
number of journals. If publisher j wins the journal, we know from Proposition 1 that
he will sell all his nj +1journals at the uniform price p∗(n +1 ) , thus realizing proﬁt
(nj +1 ) p∗(n +1 ) . If instead publisher j loses the auction, another publisher will win the
journal but the equilibrium price will still be p∗(n +1 ) ; j’s proﬁt will be njp∗(n +1 ) .
Therefore, the increase in publisher j’s proﬁt from winning the auction with respect to
losing it is p∗(n+1)for j ∈ {1,...,N}, regardless of the identity of the winner. Hence, all
the publishers have the same willingness to pay and make the same bid bj = p∗(n+1)for
all j ∈ {1,...,N}.
3.5.2 Bundling
Under bundling, the industry proﬁt depends on who wins the auction, unlike in the
previous case of no-bundling. Therefore, a loser’s proﬁt depends on the identity of the
winner through pecuniary externalities and some care is needed to evaluate a publisher’s
willingness to pay for the journal. We obtain the following proposition, in which b =
(b1,...,bN) denotes the equilibrium proﬁle of bids.
Proposition 5 Suppose a third-party sells a journal through the second-price auction.
Then, in the unique undominated equilibrium,
(i) Under independent pricing, all the publishers make the same bid.
(ii) Under bundling, if there are only two publishers in the auction, then b1 ≥ b2;i ft h e r e
a r ea tl e a s tt h r e ep u b l i s h e r s ,t h e nb1 >b j for any j 6=1 .
Proof. (i) The result under independent pricing is proved in subsection 3.5.1
(ii) Let Pk
j denote the equilibrium price that publisher j charges to his bundle in the case
in which publisher k wins the auction and bundles the new journal with all his existing
journals. Let πk ≡
PN
j=1 Pk
j and notice that since the industry proﬁt increases (weakly)
more as the new journal is integrated to a larger bundle, we have πj ≥ πk for any j ≤ k.18
18This is due to the strict concavity of v(·). If the inequality πj ≥ πk does not hold, we get easily a
contradiction as in the proof of proposition 3.
20Furthermore, recall that in a second price auction, for a bidder it is a weakly dominant
strategy to bid the own willingness to pay for the object. A publisher’s willingness to pay
is the diﬀerence between his proﬁt when he wins the auction and his proﬁt when he loses.




j =1 ,2, k 6= j. Hence
b1 − b2 = π
1 − π
2
We know that π1 ≥ π2 and, in particular, b1 >b 2 if π1 > π2 while b1 = b2 if π1 = π2.
Consider now the general case of N ≥ 3.L e tk∗ besuchthat Pk∗
k∗ −P1







For simplicity, we assume that k∗ is uniquely deﬁned (a property which holds generically)
but our proof can be adapted to the case in which there is more than one k∗. Then, we









j for j ≥ 2. (9)
Notice that b1 is publisher 1’s willingness to pay for the journal since, by deﬁnition bk∗ ≥ bj
for any j ≥ 2. We now show that b1 >b k∗; this inequality establishes that bj in (9) is
j’s willingness to pay and that publisher 1 wins the auction. If we have π1 > πk∗,t h e n
pecuniary externalities imply P1
j <P k∗











which is equivalent to b1 >b k∗.I fi n s t e a dπ1 = πk∗, then we have necessarily π1 = πk∗ =
M a n df r o m( 1 5 )i nt h ep r o o fo ft h e o r e m1w es t i l lﬁnd that P1
j <P k∗
j for all j/ ∈ {1,k∗},
hence (10) still holds.
Furthermore, we can show that there exists no undominated equilibrium in which pub-
lisher k (k 6=1 )b i d sbk ≥ b1. Suppose that such an equilibrium exists. Then, there are two
cases. First, publisher 1 makes the second highest bid (this includes the case of bk = b1).
In this case, we get a contradiction since we have b1 = P1
1 −Pk
1 >b k = Pk
k −P1
k from (10)
and the deﬁnition of k∗. Second, the second highest bid is made by publisher h 6=1 . Then,







This proposition implies that bundling could have a serious impact on the evolution
of market structure. In the absence of bundling, publishers have the same willingness
to pay for a journal. In contrast, under bundling, the largest publisher has always the
highest willingness to pay for the journal. Although a more careful analysis needs to
be undertaken to make a prediction on the industry dynamics, our result suggests that
bundling might create a vicious circle through which big publishers induce exit of small
publishers and become even bigger by purchasing their titles.
214 The general case of heterogenous journals
In this section we consider the general case in which journals can have diﬀerent values. We
ﬁrst study independent pricing and show that the irrelevance result holds at least between
the two extreme cases: the case of maximum industry concentration (the monopolist) and
the case of minimum industry concentration (each publisher sells only one journal). For
the intermediate setting of oligopoly, we show that the equilibrium prices under the case
of minimum industry concentration are the only possible equilibrium prices but that the
pricing game may have no (pure-strategy) NE if journals are not suﬃciently homogeneous.
We later on illustrate equilibrium non-existence through an example.
The outcome of the case in which each publisher sells only one journal (N = n)c a n
be obtained from theorem 1 by replacing Uj with u1j,w h e r eu1j represents the value of
the unique journal owned by publisher j.
Corollary 3 In the n-publisher-n-journal setting, there exists a unique SPNE. The equi-
librium prices p∗ are such that:
(i) If M ≤ v−1(u11 − u12), p∗
11 = M with E∗ = {1}.
(ii) If M is such that there exists k ∈ {2,...,n} satisfying
Pk−1
j=1 v−1(u1j − u1k) <M≤
Pk
j=1 v−1(u1j − u1k+1) (with u1n+1 ≡ 0), then E∗ = {1,...,k} and the equilibrium price
vector p∗ is such that
Pk
j=1 p∗














∗)=u1j j =1 ,...,n.
The next theorem describes the outcome under no-bundling. In part (a) of the the-
orem, we have N =1 .I np a r t( b ) ,u(h) represents the h-th highest value among all the
values of journals and ¯ p∗
−j is the price of the most expensive journal among all the journals
excluding publisher j’s ones.
Theorem 2 Consider independent pricing.
(a) In the monopoly environment, the monopolist enters and his proﬁti ss m a l l e rt h a n
M if M>
Pn
i=1 v−1(ui1) and equal to M otherwise. In the former case, the equilibrium
prices in the n-publisher-n-journal setting are the unique proﬁt maximizing prices. In the
latter case, the equilibrium prices in the n-publisher-n-journal setting are optimal for the
monopolist.
22(b) In a setting of oligopoly, assume that
Pn−1
h=1 v−1(u(h)−u(n)) <M— therefore all journals
are sold in the n-publisher-n-journal setting. There exists a unique candidate SPNE and
it is characterized as follows: all publishers enter and prices are the same as p∗ (i.e.,
those in the n-publisher-n-journal setting); p∗ is a NE of the pricing game if journals are
homogeneous enough, but not necessarily otherwise. The following condition is necessary













h6=s v0(M − π∗ + p∗
hj)
(11)
Theorem 2(a) says that the industry structure does not aﬀect the outcome in the two
extreme environments if the industry proﬁti sl o w e rt h a nM.19 Furthermore, theorem
2(b) says that if all the journals are sold in the n-publisher-n-journal setting, the outcome
is the same for any market structure with N ≥ 2 as long as the pricing game has a NE.
Since in the case of homogenous journals, all the journals are sold and the equilibrium
exists, proposition 1 is a special case of theorem 2. Equilibrium (in pure strategy) may not
exist since a multi-journal publisher may have an incentive to deviate from the candidate
equilibrium by altering several prices at the same time, which is impossible for a publisher
having only one journal. In the appendix we provide a suﬃcient condition for existence,
which is satisﬁed if journals are approximately homogenous. The next example gives an
idea of how the candidate NE may fail to be an equilibrium.
Example 3 Consider a setting with v(m)=5
√
m, M =1 2 .5, N =2 , n1 =2 , n2 =1 ,




h=1 v−1(u(h)),t h eo n l y
candidate equilibrium under independent pricing is such that p11 + p21 + p12 <M , 2=
UMB(p11,π)=UMB(p21,π) and 10 = UMB(p12,π);t h i sy i e l d sp∗
11 = p∗
21 =1 .122 and
p∗
12 =8 .81. Condition (11) is v0(M − π + p∗
12)(v0(M − π + p∗








1.446+1.122, which is (strictly)
satisﬁed. However, there exists a proﬁtable deviation for publisher 1: if he increases the
prices of each of his journals by 0.06, then the library’s payoﬀ is maximized by purchasing
only the two journals of publisher 1.20
19As in the case of homogenous goods, when the monopolist’s proﬁti se q u a lt oM, it might be possible
for him to realize π = M by selling a strict subset of his journals. Therefore, the irrelevance result does
not hold when the industry proﬁti se q u a lt oM.
20The payoﬀ from buying journals 11 and 21 is 4+5
√
12.5 − 2 ∗ 1.182 = 19.918543; the payoﬀ from
buying 11 and 12 (or 21 and 12) is 12 + 5
√
12.5 − 1.182 − 8.81 = 19.918333; the payoﬀ from buying all
the journals is 14 + 5
√
12.5 − 2 ∗ 1.182 − 8.81 = 19.7576.
23This example might appear counterintuitive since the library buys the three journals
under prices p∗ while after the increase in p11 and p21, the library buys journals 11 and 21
but not journal 12 of which the price has not increased. Note ﬁrst that conditional on that
journals 11 and 21 are purchased at prices p11 = p∗
11 + ε1 >p ∗
11 and p21 = p∗
21 + ε2 >p ∗
21,










that it is suboptimal to buy all journals, it is puzzling that the dropped journal is the one
whose price is unchanged. The direct comparisons of payoﬀs among diﬀerent alternatives
sheds light on this issue; consider ε1 = ε2 = ε. If journals 11 and 21 are purchased, the
library’s payoﬀ is reduced by v(M − π + p∗
12) − v(M − π + p∗
12 − 2ε) with respect to the
payoﬀ before the changes in prices; if journals 11 and 12 (or 21 and 12) are purchased, the
library’s payoﬀ decreases by v(M −π+p∗
11)−v(M −π+p∗
11−ε). Therefore, journal 12 is
eliminated if v(M −π+p∗
12)−v(M −π+p∗
12−2ε) <v (M −π+p∗
11)−v(M −π+p∗
11−ε).
Even though 2ε > ε > 0,i fp∗
12 >p ∗
11 it is possible that the inequality holds for some ε
because of the strict concavity of v: in the previous example, it holds for ε =0 .06.T h e r e
is much more money left for books when an expensive journal is dropped than when a
cheap one is dropped. Therefore, the utility loss from spending 2ε less money on books
in the former case can be smaller than the utility loss from spending ε less money in the
latter case.
Our previous result on bundling (theorem 1) is valid regardless of whether the journals
a r eh o m o g e n o u so rh e t e r o g e n o u ss i n c et h er e l e v a n tp a r a m e t e r sa r et h ev a l u e s(U1,...,U N)
of the diﬀerent bundles. Conditional on equilibrium existence under independent pricing,
all the other results that we obtained in the case of homogenous journals hold in the general
case of heterogenous journals as well: the results regarding the incentive to bundle, the
eﬀect of bundling on proﬁts, social welfare, mergers and the incentive to acquire a journal
hold in the general case. We also emphasize that in the three stage game in which each
publisher chooses between bundling and no-bundling, there always exists a SPNE in which
every active publisher bundles his journals and E∗ and P∗ are determined by theorem 1.
Furthermore, any SPNE in which a publisher does not bundle his journals requires the
use of a weakly dominated strategy from proposition 2(i).
5 Concluding remarks
Our analysis reveals that there is a strong conﬂict between the private and social incentives
of bundling e-journals: each publisher wants to bundle his journals and bundling increases
24the industry proﬁt but reduces social welfare. In particular, big publishers’ bundling not
only reduces consumption of monographs but also can make small publishers unable to sell
their journals even though they own high-quality journals. In this respect, it is noteworthy
that Wolters Kluwer, which is the sixth-largest player in the industry by revenues, recently
opted to exit scientiﬁc publishing and to focus solely on medical publishing citing lack of
scale as the reason for the exit.21
We found that bundling has two other important eﬀects. First, bundling creates
incentives for mergers. However, any asymmetry-increasing merger reduces social welfare
by reducing book and journal consumption. In contrast, mergers among small publishers
who would not be able to sell their journals because of their lack of size might increase
social welfare. Alternatively, it would be desirable for small publishers having high-quality
journals to sell their journals through a common agency as in the case of JSTOR. Second,
bundling can have a serious impact on the evolution of market structure by changing
the incentive to acquire other journals. We have shown that in the absence of bundling,
publishers have the same willingness to pay for a journal while, under bundling, the
largest publisher has always the highest willingness to pay. Hence, bundling might create
a vicious cycle through which big publishers induce exit of small publishers and become
even bigger by purchasing their titles.
Finally, our framework can be applied to other economic situations such as bundling
(block booking) in distribution of movies, TV or radio programs22. Our analysis suggests
that block booking of high-quality movies with low-quality ones would make it diﬃcult
for small producers to get their movies into theaters even though they have high-quality
and therefore provides a rationale for the per se illegal status of block booking in U.S.
under section 1 of the Sherman Act.23
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Appendix
Lemma 1 Let A denote a set of items with PA =
P
a∈A pa ≤ M. If only the items in A
are available for purchase, then all of them are purchased if and only if ua+v(M −PA) ≥
v(M − PA + pa) for all a ∈ A.
27Proof. Let UA ≡
P
a∈A ua.
(⇒) If buying all the items in A is optimal, then buying all must give a higher utility
than buying all except an item a for all a ∈ A. Therefore, we get the following inequality:
UA + v(M − PA) ≥ UA − ua + v(M − PA + pa), for all a ∈ A,
which is equivalent to ua + v(M − PA) ≥ v(M − PA + pa) for all a ∈ A.
(⇐)L e tB ⊆ A denote a subset of A with PB =
P
a∈B pa and UB ≡
P
a∈B ua.S u p p o s e
that ua + v(M − PA) ≥ v(M − PA + pa) holds for all a ∈ A, which implies
X
a∈B




Furthermore, since UMB(pa,P A) is strictly concave in the ﬁrst argument and PB =
P
a∈B pa,w eh a v e : X
a∈B
UMB(pa,P A) ≥ UMB(PB,P A),
implying UB ≥ UMB(PB,P A). If this inequality holds, buying all items in A gives a higher
utility than buying all except a subset B for any B ⊆ A since
UA + v(M − PA) ≥ UA − UB + v(M − PA + PB) ⇔ UB ≥ UMB(PB,P A).
Therefore, buying all the items in A is optimal.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1
We ﬁrst prove two lemmas which allow us to easily prove theorem 1. We ﬁrst analyze
the game starting at stage two. In the following lemma we consider the case in which
all the publishers entered at stage one. This is without loss of generality since all our
arguments in the proof of the lemma hold true even if a strict subset of {1,...,N} entered
at stage one.
Lemma 2 Suppose that all publishers enter.
(i) There exists a (unique) NE P∗ i nw h i c he a c hp u b l i s h e rm a k e sas t r i c t l yp o s i t i v ep r o ﬁt








j )=Uj0 − v(P
∗
j0) ≥ 0 for any {j,j
0} ⊂ {1,...,N}. (12)
(ii) There exists a (unique) NE P∗ i nw h i c he a c hp u b l i s h e rm a k e sas t r i c t l yp o s i t i v ep r o ﬁt
with πB∗ <Mif and only if M>
PN
j=1 v−1(Uj). P∗ satisﬁes (4).
28P r o o fo f( i )We split the proof into two claims.
Claim 1 P∗ such that P∗
j > 0 for any j and πB∗ = M is a NE if and only if it satisﬁes
(12).
(⇐)S u p p o s ePj = P∗
j > 0 for any j with πB∗ = M and P∗.satisﬁes (12). Consider now
a deviation of publisher j.F o r a n y Pj ≤ P∗
j , all bundles are sold by lemma 1 and the
proﬁto fj is Pj. If publisher j sets Pj >P ∗
j , then the library can aﬀord at most N − 1
bundles and U − Uk + v(P∗
k) <U− Uj + v(Pj) for any k 6= j. Thus, the library buys all
the bundles except Bj and j’s proﬁti s0 .
(⇒) Assume that a NE P∗ exists such that P∗
j > 0 for any j and πB∗ = M.B yl e m m a1 ,
all the bundles are sold if and only if
Uj ≥ v(P
∗
j ) for j =1 ,...,N. (13)
In order for publisher j to have no incentive to increase Pj above P∗
j , the following
condition — which jointly with (13) reduces to (12) — must be satisﬁed:
U − Uk + v(P
∗
k) ≤ U − Uj + v(P
∗
j ) for any j,k (14)
To see why, suppose U − Uk + v(P∗
k) >U− Uj + v(P∗
j ) for some j,k and publisher j
slightly increases Pj above P∗
j . Then, the library cannot aﬀord to buy all the bundles
and U − Uk + v(P∗
k) >U− Uj + v(Pj) i m p l i e st h a ti tp r e f e r st od r o pB k rather than Bj.
Therefore, j’s proﬁt is higher after the price increase.
Claim 2 A (unique) P exists which satisﬁes Pj > 0 for any j, πB = M and (12) if
and only if
PN−1
j=1 v−1(Uj − UN) <M≤
PN
j=1 v−1(Uj) holds.
Write (P1,...,PN−1) as a function of PN by using (12): Pj = v−1[Uj − UN + v(PN)],f o r





−1[Uj − UN + v(PN)] + PN − M =0 (15)
F is strictly increasing in PN and v−1(UN) is the highest value of PN consistent with
(13). We ﬁnd F(0) =
PN−1
j=1 v−1(Uj − UN) − M and F[v−1(UN)] =
PN
j=1 v−1(Uj) − M.
Thus, a (unique) solution P∗
N > 0 to (15) exists if and only if
PN−1
j=1 v−1(Uj −UN) <M≤
PN
j=1 v−1(Uj) is satisﬁe d .T h i sp r o v e ss t a t e m e n t( i )o ft h el e m m a .
P r o o fo f( i i )The proof of this statement requires proving three claims.
Claim 1 P∗ such that P∗
j > 0 for any j and πB∗ <Mis a NE if and only if it satisﬁes
(4).
29(⇐) Assume that P such that Pj > 0 for any j and πB <Msatisﬁes (4). Then publisher
j has no incentive to increase the price of Bj above Pj because that would induce the
library not to buy Bj.
(⇒) Assume a NE P∗ exists such that P∗
j > 0 for any j and πB∗ <M. Then the inequality
U +v(M −πB∗) ≥ U −Uj +v(M −πB∗ +P∗
j ) must hold for any j, otherwise the library
does not buy all the bundles. However, if the above inequality is satisﬁed strictly for a
particular j, then publisher j (given P−j =P∗
−j)h a st h ei n c e n t i v et od e v i a t eb yc h o o s i n g
Pj >P ∗
j such that U + v(M − πB∗
−j − Pj) >U− Uj + v(M − πB∗
−j) and in this case the
library still buys all the bundles, including Bj. Therefore, (4) needs to be satisﬁed by P∗.
Claim 2 If (4) has a solution such that πB <M,t h e nM>
PN
j=1 v−1(Uj).
Let ε ≡ M − πB > 0.T h e n( 4 )i sw r i t t e na sv(ε + Pj) − v(ε)=Uj for any j.T h e r e f o r e ,





j=1 v−1[Uj + v(ε)] − nε >
PN
j=1 v−1(Uj).
Claim 3 If M>
PN
j=1 v−1(Uj), then (4) has a solution such that πB <M ;m o r e o v e r ,
such a solution is unique.




−1[Uj + v(M − π)] + (N − 1)π = NM (16)
At π =0t h el e f th a n ds i d ei sl a r g e rt h a nNM since Uj > 0 for any j.A t π = M
t h el e f th a n ds i d ei s
PN
j=1 v−1(Uj)+( N − 1)M which is smaller by assumption than
NM. Thus, there exists a π∗ ∈ (0,M) which solves (16) and prices are obtained as
Pj = π∗−M+v−1[Uj+v(M−π∗)]. Furthermore, the left hand side of (16) is monotonically
decreasing in π,h e n c eπ∗ is unique and so equilibrium prices.
We now consider the three stage game and present the next lemma which focuses on
entry:
Lemma 3 (i) If
Pk−1
j=1 v−1(Uj −Uk) <Mfor some k ∈ {2,...,N}, {1,...,k} j E∗ in any
SPNE. For any M>0, publisher 1 enters the market in any SPNE.
(ii) If M ≤ v−1(U1 − U2),i na n yS P N Ej/ ∈ E∗ for any j>1.I f
Pk−1
j=1 v−1(Uj − Uk) <
M ≤
Pk
j=1 v−1(Uj −Uk+1) for some k ∈ {2,...,N} where UN+1 ≡ 0, in any SPNE j/ ∈ E∗
for any j>k .
Proof of (i): Suppose that
Pk−1
j=1 v−1(Uj − Uk) <Mfor some k ∈ {2,...,N}.W ep r o v e
that if j/ ∈ E∗ for some j ≤ k, then publisher j has an incentive to enter since P∗
j > 0 in
any NE of the game which starts at stage two when the set of active publishers is E∗∪{j}.
30Consider an arbitrary NE P∗ of this game and let T denote the subset of publishers in
E∗ ∪ {j} which obtain a positive proﬁt in this NE. Arguing by contradiction, suppose
that j/ ∈ T. This fact implies (i)
P
h∈T P∗
h = M, otherwise publisher j may earn a positive
proﬁt by setting Pj smaller than M −
P
h∈T P∗
h and close to 0; (ii) h/ ∈ T for any h>j
since, otherwise, j would gain P∗
h > 0 by setting Pj = P∗
h for some h>jsuch that h ∈ T
(in this case, the library would prefer to buy Bj rather than Bh); therefore T ⊂ {1,...,k}.
Let z ∈ argminh∈T[Uh − v(P∗
h)];t h u s ,Uh − v(P∗
h) ≥ Uz − v(P∗
z) for any h ∈ T or,
equivalently, v−1[Uh−Uz+v(P∗
z)] ≥ P∗








z. This right hand side is increasing in P∗
z and v−1(Uz−Uj) is the highest possible
value for P∗
z:i fP∗
z >v −1(Uz−Uj), then publisher j can realize a positive proﬁt by setting
Pj close to 0 since, after buying the bundles Bh for h ∈ T\{z}, the library would prefer to
buy Bj rather than Bz.A tP∗
z = v−1(Uz −Uj), M ≤
P








−1(Uh − Uj) (17)





Uk) and the latter term is smaller than M by assumption. Therefore, (17) is violated and
we obtain a contradiction.
T h ea r g u m e n ti nt h eﬁrst paragraph of the proof taken with k =1leads to the
contradiction that the set T is such that
P
h∈T P∗
h = M and h/ ∈ T for any h ≥ 1.T h u s ,
1 ∈ E∗ in any SPNE.
P r o o fo f( i i ) :I nt h i sp r o o f ,l e tk =1if M<v −1(U1−U2); otherwise k is deﬁn e da si nt h e
statement of lemma 3(ii). We know {1,...,k} j E∗.S u p p o s et h a tj ∈ E∗ for some j>k
and, to ﬁx the ideas (without loss of generality), that h/ ∈ E∗ for any h>j .W eb e l o w
prove that no NE of the game starting at stage two exists such that P∗
h > 0 for any h ∈ E∗.
From lemma 2 above, the existence of such NE requires
P
h∈E∗\{j} v−1(Uh − Uj) <M ,




h=1 v−1(Uh−Uk+1) ≥ M,w h e r e
the ﬁrst inequality follows from {1,...,k} ⊆ E∗.T h e r e f o r e ,w eo b t a i nac o n t r a d i c t i o n .
♣ P r o o fo ft h e o r e m1
We note that lemma 2 can be adapted to the setting in which only the k largest publishers
entered at stage one by replacing N with k.
P r o o fo f( i ) :L e m m a3i m p l i e sE∗ = {1}; lemma 2(i) implies P1 = M.
P r o o fo f( i i ) : Lemma 3 implies E∗ = {1,...,k}. Lemma 2(i) written with k instead
of N implies that a (unique) NE P∗ exists in which each publisher makes a strictly
positive proﬁtw i t hπB∗ = M. In order to prove that (3) holds, we need to show that
31Uj − v(P∗
j ) ≥ Uk+1 for any j ∈ E∗. Adapting the proof of lemma 2(i) to our setting with
k active publishers, we infer that P∗ satisﬁes (12), hence let Pj = v−1[Uj − Uk + v(Pk)],





−1[Uj − Uk + v(Pk)] + Pk − M =0 (18)
Since G is strictly increasing and
Pk−1
j=1 v−1(Uj − Uk) <M≤
Pk
j=1 v−1(Uj − Uk+1),t h e r e
exists a (unique) solution P∗
k to (18) and 0 <P ∗
k ≤ v−1(Uk − Uk+1); hence Uk − v(P∗
k) ≥
Uk+1 and Uj − v(P∗
j ) ≥ Uk+1 for any j =1 ,...,k − 1 with P∗
j = v−1[Uj − Uk + v(P∗
k)].
Proof of (iii): From lemma 3(i), each ﬁrm makes a strictly positive proﬁtu p o ne n t r y ;
Therefore, all the ﬁrms enter. The rest of the result follows from lemma 2(ii).
Here we provide the complete strategies for a SPNE. When the set of active publishers
is E 6= ∅,l e tU(j) denote the j-highest value in {Uh : h ∈ E}.I fk ∈ {1,...,#E} (#E is





U(k+1)) [with U(k+1) ≡ 0 if k =# E], the proﬁle of prices P= {Ph : h ∈ E} characterized
as follows is a NE of the game starting at stage two: Pj = M if Uj <U (k); Uj − v(Pj)=
Uh − v(Ph) ≥ U(k+1) if Uj ≥ U(k) and Uh ≥ U(k);
P
j:Uj≥U(k) Pj = M [in this NE, Bj is
sold if and only if Uj ≥ U(k)]. If instead M>
P#E
j=1 v−1(U(j)),t h e nP is a NE if and only
if it satisﬁes v(M −
P
h∈E\{j} Ph) − v(M −
P
h∈E Ph)=Uj for any j ∈ E.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
We use I ⊆ E∗ to represent the set of publishers which enter and sell their journals
independently; B ≡ E∗\I is the set of publishers which enter and bundle their journals.
Let πj denote the proﬁt of publisher j, j ∈ E∗; π ≡
P
j∈E∗ πj is the industry proﬁt. In any
SPNE we have πj > 0 for any j ∈ E∗,o t h e r w i s ej would not enter; therefore, Bj is sold
for any j ∈ B and each j ∈ I sells at least one of his journals. Without loss of generality,
we assume p1j ≥ ... ≥ pnjj for any j ∈ I.F o ra n yj ∈ I,l e tTj denote the set of journals
not sold and Si the set of sold journals; T ≡∪ i∈ITi and S ≡∪ i∈ISi. Homogeneity implies
that the h cheapest journals are sold, where h is determined endogenously.
Proof of (i) Suppose that j ∈ I and the library optimally spends πj in buying some
journals of publisher j. Then it is still optimal for the library to buy Bj at price πj.
P r o o fo f( i i )We ﬁrst prove in three steps that in any SPNE, all journals of all active
publishers are sold and use this property to prove proposition 2(ii).
Step 1 If #I ≥ 2, then each journal sold independently has the same price ˜ p: pij =˜ p
for any ij ∈ S.
32Proof. For each j ∈ I,l e tp
(1)
j ≡ maxij∈Sj{pij} b et h eh i g h e s tp r i c ef o rt h ej o u r n a l s









2 let publisher 1 increase p
(1)
1 by ε > 0 and small; we show that
all his journals in S1 are still sold, hence π1 increases. Indeed, if at least one journal of
publisher 2 with price p
(1)
2 is still purchased, then all the journals in S1 are so since they
are cheaper; if instead all journals of 2 with price p
(1)
2 are not purchased, then certainly
no journal in T is bought (pij >p
(1)
2 for any ij ∈ T) and the new industry proﬁti sa t
most π −p
(1)
2 +ε < π; u ≥ UMB(p
(1)




2 +ε) for a small
ε. With a similar argument we prove that pi1 is constant for any i1 ∈ S1.I f p
(1)
1 >p i1
for some i1 ∈ S1, then 1 can charge a uniform price for his journals in S1 such that his
proﬁt slightly increases if all journals in S1 are sold. This is certainly the case since (i) if
at least one journal of publisher 2 with price p
(1)
2 is still purchased, then all the journals
in S1 are so since they are cheaper; (ii) if instead all journals of 2 with price p
(1)
2 are not
purchased, then no journal in T is bought and the positive pecuniary externality eﬀect is
at work.
Step 2 If #I ≥ 2, then all the journals are sold.
Proof. If i1 ∈ T1 for some i, let publisher 1 set pi1 = ε and reduce all prices of journals in
S1 by ε
1+n1. All journals in S1∪{i1} are purchased both if some journal of 2 is so (because
the journals in S1 ∪ {i1} are cheaper then the journals in S2) and also if no journal of 2
is bought, in view of positive pecuniary externality.
Step 3 In no SPNE we have I = {1} and T1 6= ∅.
Proof. If I = {1}, T1 6= ∅ and π <M, let 1 charge uniform price p1 = π1+ε
n1 for all of his
journals. Then all his journals are purchased since u ≥ UMB(p
(1)
1 ,π) and p
(1)
1 >p 1 imply
u ≥ UMB(p1,π + ε) if ε is small.
If I = {1}, T1 6= ∅ and π = M,l e tk =# T1 and k0 =# S1. Consider the deviation of
j ∈ B which consists in increasing the price of Bj by ε > 0. A necessary condition for
this deviation to be not proﬁtable is that there exists kj such that
U − Uj + kju + v(Pj − kj¯ pj) ≥ U − u + v(p
(1)
1 − ε) (19)
where ¯ pj is the average price of the kj cheapest journals in T1 Suppose 1 bundles all journals
at price P1 = π1 + δ. Then the payoﬀ from dropping Bj is U − Uj + v(Pj − δ), while the
payoﬀ from eliminating B1 is U −U1 +v(π1);w ep r o v et h a tU1 +v(Pj −δ) >U j +v(π1).
Since U1 =( k0 + k)u and (19) hold, it suﬃces to prove that k0u + Uj + v(p
(1)
1 − ε) −






33Therefore, in the rest of the proof we can assume that all journals of all active pub-
lishers are sold.
Consider ﬁrst the case in which π <M . In view of the analysis carried out in the proof
of theorem 224,w eh a v eua = UMB(pa,π) for any item a (a journal or a bundle); suppose
that publisher j bundles his nj ≥ 2 journals at price Pj = πj+ε with ε > 0 and small. We
prove that Bj is going to be sold, hence the proﬁt of publisher j increases with respect
to individual sale. Denote by Z the set of items which the library does not buy after
the bundling by publisher j; PZ ≡
P
a∈Z Pa; we now derive a contradiction under the
assumption that B1 belongs to Z. The library’s payoﬀ is then
P
a/ ∈Z ua +v(M −π+PZ),
b u ti fi ta d d sB1 to the items it purchases its payoﬀ becomes nju+
P
a/ ∈Z ua+v(M −π+
PZ − π1 − ε) and it is larger than
P
a/ ∈Z ua + v(M − π + PZ) if and only if nju + v(M −
π + PZ − π1 − ε) >v (M − π + PZ), which is equivalent to
nju>U MB(π1 + ε,π − PZ + π1 + ε) (20)
From u = UMB(˜ p,π) we ﬁnd nju>U MB(π1,π) and since π1 ≤ PT, (20) holds at ε =0
and by continuity it holds for a small ε > 0 as well.
Consider now the case of π = M.T h e nw eh a v eua −v(M −π+pa)=z ≥ 0 for any item
a, in view of the proof of theorem 2 If publisher j bundles his nj journals at price πj + ε
with ε > 0 and small, the library has not enough money to buy all available items, but it
will purchase all except one by lemma 1. The payoﬀ from excluding Bj is U −unj +v(πj)
and the payoﬀ from dropping a diﬀerent item a is U − ua + v(pa − ε). The latter payoﬀ
is larger than the former since πj = nj˜ p and nju − v(nj˜ p) >n jz>z= ua − v(pa), hence
the inequality nju − v(πj) >u a − v(pa − ε) holds for a small ε.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
Without loss of generality, we suppose that publisher 1 merges with publisher 2.L e t
PBM∗
j and PAM∗
j denote the prices before the merger and after the merger, respectively,
of Bj, j =1 ,...,N; P∗
1&2 is the price charged by publisher 1&2 after the merger. Consider
ﬁrst the case in which
PN
j=1 v−1(Uj) <M,s ot h a tπBM∗ <Mand assume that v−1(U1 +
U2)+
PN
j=3 v−1(Uj) <M, otherwise it is obvious that πAM∗ > πBM∗. To prove the result
by contradiction, we suppose πAM∗ ≤ πBM∗. Condition (4) implies











24Since we must consider the case in which some journals are bundled while the others are not, we




2 ,πBM∗) >U MB(PBM∗
1 + PBM∗













v0(M − π + Pj)
< 0 (23)
which says that the merger (weakly) increases the proﬁt of any non-merged publisher.
Since the merger increases each publisher’s proﬁt, it contradicts the assumption πAM∗ ≤
πBM∗. Therefore, we must have πAM∗ > πBM∗; this implies that the proﬁt of publisher




T h er e s u l tc a nb es i m i l a r l yp r o v e df o rt h ec a s ei nw h i c h
Pk−1
j=1 v−1(uj − uk) <M≤
Pk
j=1 v−1(uj − uk+1) for some k ≥ 3,s ot h a tE∗ = {1,...,k} and πBM∗ = M.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2
P r o o fo ft h e o r e m2 ( a ) : Consider the case M>
Pn
i=1 v−1(ui1).L e tπI∗ denote the
industry proﬁt under the n-publisher-n-journal setting. We ﬁrst prove by contradiction
that the monopolist cannot achieve a proﬁt higher than πI∗. Suppose that the monopolist
can realize a proﬁt π > πI∗. T h i si m p l i e st h a ta m o n gt h ej o u r n a l ss o l d ,t h e r em u s tb e
at least a journal i1 of which the price pi1 is strictly higher than the price under the
n-publisher-n-journal setting p∗
1i. Then, we have:




This implies that the journal is not purchased and we get a contradiction.
With a similar argument, we can prove by contradiction that selling all the journals
at prices p∗ is the only way to realize πI∗.I ft h e r ei sa n yo t h e rw a yt oa c h i e v et h ep r o ﬁt
πI∗,t h e na m o n gt h ej o u r n a l ss o l d ,t h e r em u s tb ea tl e a s taj o u r n a li1 of which the price
pi1 is strictly higher than p∗
1i and this journal cannot be sold as we have seen above.
If M ≤
Pn
i=1 v−1(ui1), the monopolist can obtain proﬁt M by choosing the prices p∗ as
under the n-publisher-n-journal setting because they induce the library to buy all the
journals 11,...,k1 from lemma 1.
Proof of theorem 2(b):S t e p s1a n d2b e l o ws h o wt h a ti f
Pn−1
h=1 v−1(u(h)−u(n)) <M,
the only possible NE prices in the pricing game, conditional on all publishers entering,






i=1 v−1(uij) <M,t h e ni na n yN Eo ft h ep r i c i n gg a m et h ec o n d i t i o n
uij = UMB(pij,π) is satisﬁed for any ij.
Proof. By using lemma 1 as in the proof to part (a) above we ﬁnd that π <Min any
NE. Lemma 1 also implies
uij ≥ UMB(pij,π) (24)
for any ij. We now prove by contradiction that any NE prices satisfy uij = UMB(pij,π).
Suppose that (24) is satisﬁed strictly for some journal of publisher j;t oﬁxi d e a s ,s u p p o s e
without loss of generality that j =1and that (24) is slack for i =1 ,...,n0
1 and binds
for i = n0
1 +1 ,...,n1. Let publisher 1 increase slightly pi1 for i =1 ,...,n0
1 and reduce pi1
slightly for i = n0
1+1,...,n1, without changing the sum of prices of his journals. Now, (24)
is slack for all journals of 1 and all journals are still purchased. We now want to prove
that the proﬁt of publisher 1 increases if p11 is increased by a small ε > 0 because all his
journals are still purchased. At the new prices p0, suppose it is optimal for the library to





purchasing also journal i1 the library’s payoﬀ increases by ui1 − UMB(pi1,π − P0
T).T h e








i=1 v−1(uij),t h e ni na n yN Euij −
UMB(pij,π) is non-negative and constant over ij.




i=1 v−1(uij),t h e nπ = M in any NE because, by arguing as in
the proof of theorem 1, we see that the system uij = UMB(pij,π) has no solutions. Let
zij = uij −v(pij) and z =m i n ij{zij};w ep r o v et h a ti fzij >zfor some ij, then there exist
ap r o ﬁtable deviation for publisher j;t oﬁx ideas, suppose without loss of generality that
j =1and that zi1 >zfor i =1 ,...,n0
1 and zi1 = z for i = n0
1 +1 ,...,n1. Let publisher 1
increase slightly pi1 for i =1 ,...,n0
1 and reduce pi1 slightly for i = n0
1 +1 ,...,n 1, without
changing the sum of prices of his journals; let p0
i1 be the new price vector for journals of 1.
Now z0
i1 >zfor all i and all journals are still purchased. We want to prove that the proﬁt
of publisher 1 increases if p11 is increased by a small ε > 0 because all his journals are still
purchased. Now the library cannot aﬀord to buy all the journals, but it can aﬀord to (and
is willing to) purchase n−1 journals by lemma 1. The library’s payoﬀ if it drops journal
i1 is U −ui1+v(p0
i1−η) (η =0if i =1 , η = ε otherwise) and it is U −uij +v(pij)=U −z
if it eliminates a journal ij (j 6=1 ) such that zij = z.S i n c eui1 −v(p0
i1) >zfor any i and
ε is small, we have U − z>U− ui1 + v(pi1 − η) for any i.
Step 3 (11) is a necessary condition for p∗ to be a NE of the pricing game.
Proof. Suppose publisher 1 modiﬁes the prices of journals 11 to n11 by ε1,...,εn1,r e -
36spectively, with ε = ε1 +...+εn1 > 0;25 the new prices for journals of 1 are pi1 = p∗
i1 +εi,
i =1 ,...,n1. After these changes in prices, not all journals will be purchased; this is
obvious if π = M, otherwise use lemma 1 and the equalities uij = UMB(p∗
ij,π) for all ij.
However, if ε is small then only one journal will be dropped and the remaining n−1 will
be purchased.
The library’s payoﬀ if it drops a journal ij (j 6=1 )i sU −uij +v(M −π+p∗
ij −ε), reduced
by v(M − π + p∗
ij) − v(M − π + p∗
ij − ε)+k (k =0if π <Mand k ≥ 0 if π = M)w i t h
respect to the payoﬀ U + v(M − π) before the change in prices by 1. Since v is strictly
concave, this reduction in payoﬀ is minimized for the journal ij (j 6=1 ) with the highest
price; let ¯ p∗
−1 denote the highest price for a journal not owned by publisher 1. If instead
the library does not buy a journal i1,i t sp a y o ﬀ is U − ui1 + v(M − π + p∗
i1 − ε + εi),
reduced by v(M − π + p∗
i1) − v(M − π + p∗
i1 − ε + εi)+k. Therefore, the library prefers
to drop the highest priced journal of the other publishers rather than one journal of 1 if
v(M − π +¯ p∗
−1) − v(M − π +¯ p∗
−1 − ε) <v (M − π + p∗
i1) − v(M − π + p∗
i1 − ε + εi) for
i =1 ,...,n 1, a set of conditions equivalent to v(M − π +¯ p∗
−1) − v(M − π +¯ p∗
−1 − ε) <
min{v(M−π+p∗
i1)−v(M−π+p∗
i1−ε+εi), i =1 ,...,n1}.26 Therefore, given ε, the library
is interested in choosing ε1,...,εn1 such that min{v(M −π+p∗
i1)−v(M −π+p∗
i1−ε+εi),
i =1 ,...,n 1} is maximized. The optimal values of ε1,...,εn1,g i v e nε, are denoted by
¯ ε1,...,¯ εn1 and satisfy
v(M − π + p∗
i1) − v(M − π + p∗
i1 − ε + εi)=
v(M − π + p∗
n11) − v(M − π + p∗
n11 − ε + εn1) for i =1 ,...,n1 − 1
ε1 + ε2 + ... + εn1 = ε
(25)
if there exists a solution to (25). We prove in the following that (25) has a solution if ε is
close to 0. Therefore, a proﬁtable deviation for publisher 1 exists if, for a small value of
ε, the following inequality holds
v(M −π +¯ p
∗
−1)−v(M −π +¯ p
∗




11 −ε+¯ ε1) (26)






















h1) at ε =0 .
Therefore, the derivative of the right hand side of (26) at ε =0is −v0(M −π+p∗
11)(−1+
25We allow that the prices of some journals are not changed.
26With n1 =1this inequality fails because ε1 = ε and the right hand side is 0.
27By totally diﬀerentiating we ﬁnd
v0(M − π + p∗
i1 − ε + εi)(dε − dεi)=v0(M − π + p∗









h6=s v0(M−π+ph1) and the derivative of the left hand side of (26) at ε =0is
v0(M − π +¯ p∗
−1);t h i sp r o v e st h a t( 1 1 )w i t hj =1is satisﬁed if no proﬁtable deviation
for publisher 1 exists. The example after theorem 2 shows that (11) is not a suﬃcient
condition.
As u ﬃcient condition for p∗ to be a NE of the pricing game
Step 1 Ap r o ﬁtable deviation for publisher 1 exists if and only if there exists a
proﬁtable deviation which induces the library to drop only one journal of other publishers.
Proof. Let πnew denote the industry proﬁta f t e rt h ec h a n g ei np r i c e sb y1 . S u p p o s e
that after the change in prices by 1, the library stops purchasing two journals a and b of
publishers diﬀerent from 1, with prices p∗
a and p∗
b ≥ p∗
a. This implies ε >p ∗
b, otherwise we
have a contradiction since the industry proﬁt after buying all journals except b is smaller
than the previous proﬁt (πnew ≤ π) and therefore UMB(pa,πnew) ≤ a from UMB(pa,π) ≤ a.
Notice that ui1 ≥ UMB(pi1,πnew) for i =1 ,...,n1. Now let all the prices of journals of 1
be multiplied by λ ∈ (0,1) such that λ
Pn1







i1;w ep r o v e
that all journals of 1 are purchased at the new prices, implying that if 1 can increase his
proﬁtb yε by inducing the library to drop two journals of the other publishers, then he
can also deviate by inducing the library to drop only one other journal.
In case a and b are not purchased, then all journals of 1 are purchased since ui1 >
UMB(λpi1,πnew − p∗
b) for i =1 ,...,n 1. In case that only one journal between a and bis
purchased, with price p∗
c ∈ {p∗
a,p ∗
b}, then the library’s maximum expense is π0 = πnew −
p∗
b + p∗
c ≤ πnew and we have ui1 >U MB(λpi1,π0) for i =1 ,...,n1.
Step 2 No proﬁtable deviation for publisher 1 exists if ˆ ε ≡ n1
n1−1(M −π +p∗
n11) > ¯ p∗
−1













Proof. We start by showing that a solution to (25) exists for any ε < ˆ ε. Without loss
of generality, assume u11 ≥ u21 ≥ ... ≥ un11, which implies p∗
11 ≥ p∗
21 ≥ ... ≥ p∗
n11.F r o m
v(M −π +p∗
i1)−v(M −π +p∗
i1 −ε+εi)=v(M −π +p∗
n11)−v(M −π +p∗
n11 −ε+εn1)
the concavity of v implies that, given εn1 ≤ ε, the left hand side is larger than the right
hand side if εi = p∗
n11 − p∗





i1 + εn1,εn1] for i =1 ,...,n1 (28)

























By setting εn1 = ε we obtain εi = ε for all iand ε1 + ... + εn1 = n1ε > ε; by setting
εn1 = ε
n1 we obtain εi < ε
n1 for i =1 ,...,n1 − 1 because of (28), hence ε1 + ... + εn1 < ε.
Therefore, there exists εn1 ∈ ( ε
n1,ε) which, together with the values found by using (29),
solves (25). However, we can set εn1 = ε
n1 only as long as M − π + p∗
n11 − ε + ε
n1 ≥ 0,
which is equivalent to ε ≤ ˆ ε.N o t i c et h a tw i t hεn1 = ε




M − π + p∗
i1 − ε + εi >M− π + p∗
n11 − ε + ε
n1.
We have proved above that we can restrict attention to deviations of publisher 1 which
induce the library to drop only one journal of the other publishers. Hence, it suﬃces to
consider the values of ε in (0, ¯ p∗
−1).S i n c eˆ ε > ¯ p∗
−1, for every ε < ¯ p∗
−1 there exists a solution
to (25) and (27) implies that dropping one journal of publisher 1 is better for the library
than dropping any journal of other publishers.28
Since ˆ ε ≥
n1
n1−1p∗
n11, the inequality ˆ ε > ¯ p∗
−1 is satisﬁed if ¯ p∗
−1 is not much larger than
p∗
n11, the price for the lowest priced journal of publisher 1; this fact reduces to saying that
journals are approximately homogeneous. Likewise, if journals of publisher 1 are nearly
homogeneous then ¯ ε1 is about equal to ε
n1 and (27) holds since ¯ p∗
−1 is close to p∗
11.
28We remark that for values of ε not small the library may wish to drop two or more journals of 1,
even though (27) is violated.
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